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INTRODUCTION 
 
 A REMARKABLE OCCURRENCE:  
PROGRESS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN AN  
“OPEN” MYANMAR 
Andrew J. Morgan † 
Abstract: A remarkable thing happened in Myanmar in the summer of 2013.  A 
government that, in recent decades, enacted and carried out among the most draconian 
and repressive policies toward civil society organizations in the world sat down with a 
large, representative body of such organizations to hear criticisms of a recently passed 
law.  Perhaps more remarkably, the government then revised the law in response to these 
criticisms, fundamentally altering the people’s right to freely associate.  This introductory 
piece to the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal’s special edition devoted to Myanmar 
provides context for this seemingly remarkable occurrence.  It demonstrates one 
important and hopeful occurrence in Myanmar’s immense and ongoing reform effort.  It 
is the author’s hope that this occurrence is merely one example of many systemic reforms 
underway to address the myriad issues facing Myanmar and its people.   
I. INTRODUCTION: REFORM IN MYANMAR AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
CIVIL SOCIETY  
The past three years have seen remarkable change in the country of 
Myanmar (also known as Burma).1  With the “opening up” of Myanmar in 
2011 after decades of repressive military rule, much attention has been given 
to reform efforts taking place domestically.  Since President Thein Sein 
came to power in November 2010, the government of Myanmar transitioned 
from a strictly military government to a military-backed civilian government 
and has begun a significant reform process.2  The government freed many 
political prisoners, including luminary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, relaxed 
                                                      
† Juris Doctor (J.D.) candidate, 2014, University of Washington School of Law.  Master of Public 
Service (M.P.S.), 2012, The University of Arkansas Clinton School of Public Service.  The author would 
like to thank the Editor-In-Chief, the editorial staff, and his other colleagues on the Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal for their valuable comments and support in composing this introduction.  Any mistakes lie 
with the author.   
1 The State Law and Order Restoration Council changed the name of the country from Burma to 
Myanmar in 1989, following crackdowns on the 1988 protests that led to Aung San Su Kyi’s house arrest, 
and insisted on its use ever since.  See DAVID I. STEINBERG, A VOID IN MYANMAR: CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
BURMA (1997), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Steinbergpaper.htm.  Although it has been a 
political issue in the past, with the opposition refusing to accept the name, today Myanmar seems to be 
used by all sides.  Here the term is used without political intent. 
2 See U.S. President Obama Hails Burma’s “Remarkable Journey”, BBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20386066. 
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censorship, and enacted economic reforms.3  Suu Kyi’s National League for 
Democracy (“NLD”) party, which boycotted the 2010 elections that saw 
Thein Sein’s ascendency, has since rejoined the political process.4  The NLD 
party now enjoys a small presence in Parliament after winning by large 
margins in the April 2012 by-elections, which were deemed generally free 
and fair.5  In response to the reforms, many Western nations have relaxed 
sanctions against Myanmar and begun a process of engagement.6  Indeed, in 
light of these reforms and in an effort to bolster U.S. engagement in the 
country, President Barack Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to 
visit the country.7   
Corresponding to the opening up of the country, international 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and aid organizations have 
increased their activities in Myanmar. 8   While there is no doubt that 
international legal aid and non-governmental organizations can play an 
active and productive role in Myanmar, these groups should proceed with 
caution and seek to incorporate collaborative approaches to their aid 
provision if long-term, sustainable development that enshrines human rights 
is to be achieved.  To that end, it is perhaps helpful to reflect on the 
criticisms of past international aid provision in order to offer lessons for 
those interested in assistance in Myanmar, before turning to a promising 
recent example of collaborative effort between the government and civil 
society organizations. 
This introductory piece proceeds in three parts.  Part II discusses the 
ethical and practical implications of international NGOs and assistance 
groups working in foreign countries such as Myanmar, with reference to 
lessons learned in the 1960s Law and Development Movement.  Part II 
concludes with some brief recommendations for collaborative and 
participatory approaches that take into account these ethical dimensions.  
Part III provides background and context for the recent reemergence of civil 
society in Myanmar, including a short history and analysis of the repressive 
                                                      
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 See Burma poll: Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD sweeps by-elections, BBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17588313. 
6 See, e.g., Paul Eckert, U.S. lifts more sanctions on Myanmar to support reforms, REUTERS (May 2, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-myanmar-usa-sanctions-idUSBRE9411AR20130502 
(describing the loosening of sanctions by the Obama administration).  
7 See Peter Baker, Obama, In An Emerging Myanmar, Vows Support, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/world/asia/obama-heads-to-myanmar-as-it-promises-more-reforms. 
html?_r=0. 
8  See e.g., MYANMAR: Call to Build Up Local NGOs, IRIN HUMANITARIAN NEWS & ANALYSIS 
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.irinnews.org/report/91949/myanmar-call-to-build-up-local-ngos (describing the 
rapid growth of NGOs post-Cyclone Nargis and in the midst of the current reform developments). 
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policies put in place by preceding government regimes.  Finally, Part IV 
accounts the recent effort to revise and pass the law on associations, which 
affects all civil society organizations and NGOs with operations in 
Myanmar.   
II. FINDING FAULT WITH CULTURAL RELATIVISM IN GLOBAL ASSISTANCE 
EFFORTS: TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN ASSISTANCE ETHIC 
In her seminal article examining the ethical underpinnings of 
international legal assistance, Professor Shannon Roesler offered a 
compelling analysis of the legal profession’s role in development work.9  
After a brief overview of the increasingly global nature of the practice of 
law, Professor Roesler posited that “in deciding whether the legal profession 
should support commitments to global justice, we must resolve another 
ambiguity:  even if lawyers are responsible for the quality of justice in the 
broader sense, it is not clear that the responsibility extends beyond our 
national borders.”10   
 In a direct response to criticisms of the alleged lack of sensitivity to 
local and cultural contexts of the Law and Development Movement, 
Professor Roesler examines the notion that lawyers who “intervene in the 
social and political processes of other societies in order to promote particular 
values” are therefore subject to the charge that they are “imposing their own 
moral and political beliefs on others.”11  The argument that one should not 
intervene in other societies or cultures is associated with various forms of 
moral relativism.12  Theories of moral relativism hold that we can only 
answer normative questions regarding morality (i.e., what we ought to do) 
by reference to something else, such as a religious or cultural view of the 
world.13 
 After a thorough analysis of the practical ethicality of cultural 
relativism, however, Professor Roesler eschewed the theory in favor of a 
cosmopolitan ethic. 14   This notion, based on the ideas developed by 
renowned cultural theorist and philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
recognizes equanimity in the dignified human being, across boundaries and 
cultures, and promotes an ideal of equal moral worth, and a global 
                                                      
9 See generally Shannon M. Roesler, The Ethics of Global Justice Lawyering, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. 
& DEV. L.J. 185 (2010). 
10 Id. at 204. 
11 Id. at 194. 
12  Id. at 195. 
13 Id.    
14 See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS 
(2006) (outlining cosmopolitanism, the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah’s seminal cultural theory). 
498 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 3  
 
conversation on right and wrong.15  Ultimately, she concludes that the 
general objection to international assistance as an imposing force is 
grounded in theories of moral relativism and subjectivism, “which are not, in 
the end, very convincing.”16  Furthermore, she concludes that relativism is 
not a bar to engaging in the lives of those outside our cultural and political 
communities; Professor Reosler identifies “strong moral reasons—grounded 
in the ethical doctrine of cosmopolitanism”—to promote the rule of law and 
“political justice around the world.”17 
 In grappling with these ethical questions, Professor Roesler’s 
cosmopolitan global lawyers must guard against imposing legal assistance 
carte blanche—in the Law and Development fashion—if they are to affect 
legitimate change in the legal environments in which they assist.18  Roesler 
suggests that “if lawyers impose a predetermined means to political justice 
by importing the political institutions, legal rules, and legal strategies with 
which they are familiar, they risk violating the dignity of those they hope to 
assist.”19  She instead suggests that global justice lawyers should focus not 
on importing familiar laws and institutions, but on facilitating processes of 
lawmaking and social change.20   
This latter point—that legal assistance efforts should be thoroughly 
founded in the local context and in participatory processes—seems to reflect 
a growing consensus in the literature on the “new law and development 
movement.”21  As Professor Kristin Dauphinais asserted, “there is an earnest 
search for means to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated, and 
that the new law and development movement is not another unfunded 
mandate with lofty aspirations and little, or at least unsustainable, means of 
achieving them.”22 
 To that end, international NGOs, assistance organizations, and the 
organizations they partner with should recognize the need to involve 
colleagues from the host country from the outset while establishing the 
purpose and the goals of their projects.23  Further, overseas visitors must 
thoroughly immerse themselves in the local context and culture early in the 
process and maintain a high level of collaboration throughout all phases to 
                                                      
15 Roesler, supra note 9, at 203-04. 
16 Id. at 194. 
17 Id.  
18  Id. at 189. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Training a Countervailing Elite: The Necessity of an Effective Lawyering 
Skills Pedagogy for a Sustainable Rule of Law Revival in East Africa, 85 N.D. L. REV. 53, 85 (2009). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 85-86.  
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insure that the reforms they recommend can work in the local context.24  
Finally, advocates should pay particular attention, prior to and during the 
collaboration, to factors that will help sustain the reforms after the formal 
consultation ends.25 
In her own words, and consistent with a “rights-based approach,”26 
Professor Roesler asserted that to avoid the ethical pitfalls of the top-down, 
imposing model of aid, global justice lawyers should shift their focus from 
particular legal means or ends to the processes of lawmaking.27  She states 
that “instead of thinking of law in positivist terms (as a set of existing rules 
and institutions), lawyers must think in normative terms (i.e., in terms of 
what processes will produce law).”28  Drawing from Thomas McInerney, 
Professor Fran Quigley traces the evolution from criticisms of the Law and 
Development Movement to the new, participatory thinking:  
 
A defining characteristic of this formalistic approach to rule of 
law programming is its reliance on ‘transplants’ of legal 
systems characteristic of the global North into developing 
countries, despite the well-chronicled failure during the 1960s 
law and development era of this approach.  Efforts to transplant 
a theoretically high-functioning legal system into new 
postcolonial countries were and are mistakes of both hubris and 
strategy.  Thomas McInerney is among many observers who 
argue that the countries’ own indigenous civil society 
leadership—which in most cases helped lead the struggle for 
independence—needed to be supported in their own efforts to 
grow and apply their own systems of justice.  ‘[I]nclusive and 
deliberate legal reform is the sine qua non for the creation of 
legitimate law and democracy,’ McInerney writes.  “The 
                                                      
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 See, e.g., Meena Jagannath et al., A Rights-Based Approach to Lawyering: Legal Empowerment as 
an Alternative to Legal Aid in Post-Disaster Haiti, 10 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 7, 4 (2011) (advocating 
for a “rights-based approach” to legal aid provision in the aftermath of the earthquake and ensuing disasters 
in Haiti).  This article echoes agreement with proponents of consensus and participatory process.  Id.  
According to the authors, a rights-based approach “ensures that the beneficiaries of aid are informed of the 
processes that affect their lives and have the opportunity to share their perspectives in a meaningful way.”  
Id.  This is a participatory “outcome” approach to aid provision.  Id.  
27  Roesler, supra note 9, at 184. 
28 Id. at 224. 
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democratic process itself is necessary to determine the content 
of rights.”29 
 
Despite the increasing consensus among international aid practitioners that 
participatory, collaborative, and consensus-based processes address many of 
the problems with traditional models of aid provision—particularly among 
academics—the practical implications of these collaborative approaches 
offer challenges to aid practitioners on the ground.   
  The latter point becomes even more pronounced when international 
aid practitioners are faced with seemingly overwhelming humanitarian and 
human rights issues, such as those in Myanmar.  In this context, the process 
of revising and updating the law regarding associations (to which all NGOs 
are subject), which is outlined in Part IV, is a promising example of 
international organizations empowering local civil society groups to work 
with the Myanmarese government to adapt a law to meet international norms 
in the domestic context.  
III. CIVIL SOCIETY IN MYANMAR: WHO IS INVITED TO THE TABLE? 
Civil society has a long and controversial history in Myanmar.  This 
Part briefly outlines key moments of this history in order to provide context 
for the recent changes.  It is in light of this history that recent events are 
significant.  However, no conversation about the reemergence of civil 
society is complete without discussing the effects of Cyclone Nargis on 
mobilizing local and international NGOs, discussed below.  Finally, this 
section briefly sketches the recent repressive policies directed at civil society 
organizations in Myanmar to set the stage for the recent revisions discussed 
in section IV.  
 
A.  A Brief History of Civil Society in Myanmar 
   
The reemergence of civil society30 is among one of the recent and 
rapid changes occurring in Myanmar.  As long time Myanmar expert and 
                                                      
29 Fran Quigley, Growing Political Will from the Grassroots: How Social Movement Principles Can 
Reverse the Dismal Legacy of Rule of Law Interventions, 41 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 13, 40-41 
(2009). 
30 Although a loaded term, for the purposes of this discussion, I use the term civil society to mean 
the collection of: 
[N]on-ephemeral organizations of individuals banded together for a common purpose or 
purposes to pursue those interests through group activities and by peaceful means.  These 
are generally non-profit organizations, and may be local or national [or international], 
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academic, Professor David I. Steinberg noted, “[c]ivil society is . . . an 
essential element of political pluralism—the diffusion of power is the 
hallmark of modern democracies.”31  The significance, Steinberg posited:  
 
[L]ie[s] in the hypothesis that if civil society is strong and its 
citizens band together for the common good based on a sense of 
community or programmatic trust and efficacy . . . [that] 
translate[s] into overall trust in the political process of 
democracy or democratization and lead[s] to diffusion of the 
centralized power of the state.32   
 
It is precisely this characteristic of civil society that makes it a threat to 
autocratic governments. 33   Noting a brief period where civil society 
flourished between independence and the first military coup, Steinberg then 
asserts flatly that “[c]ivil society died under the Burma Socialist Programme 
Party (“BSPP”) . . . more accurately, it was murdered.”34  
Under the infamously restrictive rule of General Ne Win, he and his 
advisers managed to smother democracy in Burma, jail hundreds of political 
leaders without trials, replace Parliament with a military dictatorship, and 
implement a drastic program, called the Burmese Way to Socialism, which 
nationalized trade and industry.35  In the ensuing years, the military built the 
BSPP from loyal followers of Ne Win to vast numbers36 and introduced an 
extremely rigid socialist system that eliminated private business and brought 
all private organizations under state control.37  Consistent with this new 
system, the BSPP virtually closed the state to all outside influence:   
 
No one legally left the country without authorization, visas for 
foreigners for a period were limited to 24 hours, internal travel 
was greatly restricted, and foreign and domestic news [sic] 
subject to complete control or censorship.  Foreign missionaries 
                                                                                                                                                                 
advocacy or supportive, religious, cultural, social, professional, educational, or even 
organizations that, while not for profit, support the business sector, such as chambers of 
commerce, trade associations, etc.   
See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 3. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 5. 
34 Id. at 9. 
35 Eric Pace, Ne Win, Ex-Burmese Military Strongman, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/06/world/ne-win-ex-burmese-military-strongman-dies-at-81.html. 
36 See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 8. 
37 Id. at 9-10. 
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who left on leave were not allowed to return.  Private foreign 
assistance organizations were ordered to depart, and ties 
between internal groups and their foreign counterparts were 
truncated as far as possible.  Burma had turned from neutral to 
isolationist, and an official policy of virtual xenophobia was 
introduced.38 
 
Thus, the relatively open society that flourished in post-independence Burma 
was effectively crushed and brought under the control of the extremely 
isolationist regime of Ne Win from the years 1962 to 1988.   
By mid-1988, food shortages and economic discontent inspired mass 
protests, often spearheaded by the country’s revered Buddhist monks and 
students.39  Hundreds of thousands of people marched through the then-
capital, Rangoon, calling for a transition to democracy and an end to military 
rule in the largest mass protests in the country since independence in 1948.40  
The army seized power in a coup, abolished the 1974 Constitution, and 
silenced the protests by opening fire on unarmed dissidents, leaving more 
than 3,000 dead, according to official figures.41  Following the bloody 
crackdown, the military regime attempted to quell criticism by making 
cosmetic changes.42  The ruling BSPP party changed its name to the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council (“SLORC”) and adopted modest 
economic reforms.43   
Nevertheless, the military regime’s control of civil society continued 
as before, albeit subject to more external scrutiny and criticism due to the 
international media attention given to the country following the bloody 
crackdown of 1988.44  Indeed, at the time of his report on Civil Society in 
Burma in 1997, Steinberg wrote that there was “no let up in the attempt to 
prevent the rise of any pluralistic institutions in the society that could offer 
avenues of public debate or disagreement over state policies and the role of 
the military . . . the immediate future for civil society remains bleak.”45  
Given this dire outlook a mere fourteen years ago, civil society went 
underground, remained dormant, and is waiting for its chance to reemerge.  
                                                      
38 Id. at 10. 
39 JAYSHREE BAJORIA, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR (2013), 
available at http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/understanding-myanmar/p14385.  
40 Philippa Fogarty, Was Burma’s 1988 Uprising Worth it?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7543347.stm. 
41 See BAJORIA, supra note 39. 
42 See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 8. 
43 Id. at 11. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 13. 
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Mother Nature provided just such a chance, albeit a tragic one, which 
forever changed the history of civil society activity in Myanmar.   
 
B.  Cyclone Nargis and the Reemergence of Civil Society 
 
 Although still restricted in many important ways, civil society groups 
in Myanmar have begun to reemerge in larger numbers.  As of 2011, 
Harvard University’s Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations reported 
that the government continued to stifle an emergent, but weak, civil society 
through tight controls on media and threats to punish or restrict 
organizations that overtly support political activities.46  Nevertheless, the 
report found that the government began to allow the growth of independent 
groups that they perceived as useful or innocuous, especially social services 
providers.47  This comment argues that this change was likely due to the 
reformist attitude of the Thein Sein government.  However, one cannot 
ignore the impact of the most critical event for the growth of civil society in 
recent Myanmarese history:  Cyclone Nargis. 
Cyclone Nargis, a category four cyclone, is believed to be the worst 
recorded natural disaster in Myanmar’s history.48  On May 2, 2008, it struck 
the Irrawaddy Delta region, 250 kilometers (approximately 155 miles) 
southwest of Yangon, and worked its way inland reaching Yangon late that 
night.49  Winds of up to 200 kilometers per hour and tidal surges of up to 
four meters high caused widespread devastation. 50   As news of the 
destruction reached newsrooms around the word, the media focused on the 
government’s controversial response to offers of international humanitarian 
assistance.51  Stories of the government’s refusal to allow entry to foreign 
personnel from various aid and U.N. agencies and their blockage of military 
shipments of aid from the American, French, and British Governments 
                                                      
46 SOUBHIK RONNIE SAHA, HAUSER CENTER FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, WORKING THROUGH 
AMBIGUITY: INTERNATIONAL NGOS IN MYANMAR 5 (2011), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 
var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers/hauser/publications/reports/myanmar_ 
report_final_version_2011_09_08.pdf. 
47 Id. at 12. 
48 THE CENTRE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, LISTENING TO VOICES FROM INSIDE: MYANMAR 
CIVIL SOCIETY’S RESPONSE TO CYCLONE NARGIS 15, viii (2009), available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/ 
docs07/Cyclone_Nargis_and_Myanmar_Civil_Society_Response.pdf. 
49 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, BURMA/MYANMAR AFTER NARGIS: TIME TO NORMALISE AID 
RELATIONS, ASIA REPORT NO. 161, 2 (2008), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/ 
asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/161_burma_myanmar_after_nargis___time_to_normalise_aid_ 
relations.pdf. 
50 Id. 
51 SAHA, supra note 46, at 8. 
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dominated the media.52  France went as far as to (unsuccessfully) call on the 
U.N. Security Council to intervene militarily under the responsibility to 
protect doctrine of international law, an action that is illustrative of the high 
amount of international pressure sparked by the Cyclone.53 
 Amidst the tragedy of Cyclone Nargis, international pressure led the 
government to eventually alter its draconian response and allow aid 
organizations to operate with greater freedom in the country.  Many 
recognize Cyclone Nargis as something of a turning point for the 
humanitarian space in Myanmar.54  According to one report, there were only 
forty international NGOs operating on the ground in Myanmar prior to 
Cyclone Nargis.55  In the following year alone, the number grew to over 
100.56  Because most local civil society groups are not registered, it is 
difficult to get an accurate estimate of their numbers and thereby project 
their growth. 57   Nevertheless, international organizations operating in 
Myanmar at the time that were interviewed by the Hauser Center observed a 
rise in the number of local groups as well as their overall level of activity 
post-Cyclone Nargis.58  The response to the devastation wrought by Cyclone 
Nargis represented a turning point for civil society in Myanmar where 
government policies took a backseat to humanitarian imperatives, and, 
perhaps, were altered indefinitely.  
 
C. NGO Policies in Myanmar Have Been Restrictive and Out of 
Step with International Norms. 
  
 Civil society organizations have been subject to the extremely 
restrictive policies of the military regimes in Myanmar, making it virtually 
impossible to carry out impactful work.  Indeed, the government at various 
times has banned even small gatherings of individuals and has kept 
extremely tight control on those organizations that it has allowed to operate 
in country.59  All of this made for a populace that was extremely reluctant to 
                                                      
52 Id.; UN Frustrated at Burma Response, BBC NEWS (May 13, 2008), http://news. bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7397012.stm. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., SAHA, supra note 46, at 8. 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., MYANMAR: Call to Build Up Local NGOs, supra note 8, (noting that in 2008, Cyclone 
Nargis spawned hundreds of civil society organizations to cope with the humanitarian crisis that killed a 
reported 140,000 people and affected another 2.4 million people by U.N. estimates, and quoting Aung Tun 
Thet as saying that “Nargis was a catalytic push for the mushrooming of local NGOs.  There were 50 times 
as many NGOs as before.”). 
57 See SAHA, supra note 46, at 8. 
58 Id. 
59 See STEINBERG, supra note 1. 
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speak out on any political or human rights issues for fear of imprisonment or 
other harsh measures by the government.60  Domestically and internationally 
based NGOs and other civil society organizations are among the 
organizations that have been hindered by the government’s restrictive 
policies over the years.61   
 
1. NGOs as Civil Society Actors 
 
Non-governmental organizations have existed for centuries, but the 
term NGO is relatively young.62   Although defined in different ways, 
“NGO” is generally understood to refer to “a formal organization that is 
neither a government nor a corporate institution, but rather a voluntary 
association within civil society.”63  As Professor Jenkins defined it, “civil 
society facilitates exchanges among citizens, enables communication 
channels between citizens and the state, promotes civic action, and advances 
common interests based on civility.”64  Thus, Jenkins situated NGOs as “a 
subset of civil society organizations . . . private and voluntary, practicing 
self-governance . . . organized around a common mission.”65 
While there are many valid criticisms of NGOs and other civil society 
organizations, it is worth remembering that civil society has many virtues.  
First, civil society may serve as a countervailing force against an oppressive 
government.66  Even if the government is constituted such that different 
branches of government check and balance each other, civil society may 
serve as the ultimate check on the potential abuse of public power if these 
safeguards fail to work properly.67  Second, civil society can organize the 
public for democratic participation, and this participation in associations 
may inspire citizen interest in public affairs.68  Third, participation in civil 
society can inculcate civic values and socialize people to be responsible 
citizens.69   
                                                      
60 See generally EMMA LARKIN, FINDING GEORGE ORWELL IN BURMA (2006) (describing her 
journalistic pursuits in the country prior to the Thein Sein government’s current reform efforts and her 
stifled attempts to speak with political dissidents). 
61  See MYANMAR: Call to Build Up Local NGOs, supra note 8. 
62 Garry W. Jenkins, Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them: Lessons of the 
Anti-NGO Movement, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 459, 467 (2012). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 468. 
65 Id. 
66 Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert Post, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 1 (2002). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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The many criticisms that NGOs face, while important and worthy of 
debate, can have the unfortunate effect of being usurped by isolationist 
governments, such as Myanmar’s, in order to justify cracking down and 
instilling restrictive policies on legitimate organizations that are perceived as 
threats to the government.70  Under the reformist President Thein Sein’s 
government, the number of small community-based groups providing social, 
health, and education services grew rapidly.71   Yet groups continue to 
operate under the constant threat of repercussions, as they may not be 
officially or properly registered. 72   Governments in China, Myanmar, 
Cambodia, and several other Asian countries have implemented policies that 
impose severe funding and other restrictions on NGOs.73  These policies 
prevent NGOs from operating effectively or at all, in some cases.74 
 
2.  NGO Registration Laws in Myanmar 
 
The SLORC passed a restrictive association law in the wake of the 
1988 crackdown75 that governed the process for NGOs and civil society 
organizations to legally operate in the country.76  The Law Relating to 
Forming of Organizations No. 6/88 contained broad, vaguely defined 
restrictions that effectively banned any civil society organization from 
registering unless it maintained close ties to the government.77  Under the 
law, a member of an organization that was deemed to “disrupt law and order, 
peace and tranquility” 78  could be sentenced to up to five years 
imprisonment,79 while someone found to have any link to an unregistered 
                                                      
70 See, e.g., Brian Whitaker, Egypt's Raids on NGOs are About Control, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 
2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/30/egypt-raids-ngos-beleaguered-regime-
light (discussing the Egyptian government’s restrictive policies toward civil society organizations in that 
country). 
71 Paul Vrieze, Civil Society and MPs Draft ‘Progressive’ Association Registration Law, THE 
IRRAWADDY (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/csos-mps-draft-progressive-association-
registration-law.html. 
72 Id. 
73 See Joshua Lipes, Restrictions Hamper NGO Funding, Operations in Asia, RADIO FREE ASIA (Feb. 
28, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/ngos-02272013195650.html. 
74 Id. 
75 See infra Part III(A). 
76 See Law relating to Forming of Organizations, 1988, No. 6/88 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Myanmar/State%20LORC%20Law%20No.pdf. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at ch. III(5)(b). 
79 Id. at ch. IV (stating that “Punishments  6. Any person found guilty of committing an offence 
under Section 3 Sub section (c) or Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to five years.”). 
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organization could face up to three years in prison. 80   These harsh 
punishments and draconian policies violated the Myanmarese right to freely 
associate.81   
The current Constitution of Myanmar, which was published in 2008 
following a referendum, enshrines the freedom of association.  Paragraph 
354 of the 2008 Constitution states as follows:  
 
Every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of the following 
rights, if not contrary to the laws, enacted for Union security, 
prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility 
or public order and morality82: 1. to express and publish freely 
their convictions and opinions 83  2. to assemble peacefully 
without arms and holding procession;84 3. to form associations 
and organizations . . . 85 
 
Despite this guarantee, the laws and processes put in place by the regime in 
1988 hampered the free association of individuals, in particular those related 
to the formation of civil society and non-governmental organizations.  This 
led many NGOs to criticize and pushback against the opaque and 
cumbersome registration process and the harsh potential punishments for not 
doing so.86  In spite of this historical practice of restricting civil society 
organizations, the current Myanmar government under Thein Sein has 
shown increasing willingness to relax the restrictions and bring them in line 
with international standards.   
IV. THE RECENTLY REVISED ASSOCIATION LAW PROPOSED IN PARLIAMENT 
WAS THE PRODUCT OF A COLLABORATIVE LEGAL PROCESS 
In response to criticisms, the Thein Sein government began to signal 
its willingness to adopt reforms, and the Parliament began to legislate in the 
spring and summer of 2013.87   On July 27, 2013, the Public Affairs 
                                                      
80 Id. at ch IV (stating that “7. [a]ny person found guilty of being a member of, or aiding and abetting 
or using the paraphernalia of organizations that are not permitted to form or not permitted to continue in 
existence and provided in Section 3 Sub section (c) or that are not permitted to form as provided in Section 
5 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years.”). 
81 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, § 354, [2008], translated at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at § 354(a). 
84 Id. at § 354(b). 
85 Id. at § 354(c). 
86 SAHA, supra note 46, at 8. 
87 Vrieze, supra note 71. 
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Management Committee of Myanmar released a revised law called the Draft 
Law on Associations.88  “The Draft Law raised several critical concerns, 
including: constraints on unregistered associations, problematic registration 
procedures, re-registration requirements, and troubling ambiguities on 
several issues” that would make it difficult for domestic and foreign NGOs 
alike to safely carry out their programs without fear of reprisal. 89  
  In an unprecedented show of collaboration, however, on August 15, 
2013, representatives from more than 275 civil society organizations (local 
and foreign), community-based organizations, and networks met with 
Myanmarese Members of Parliament and the Parliamentary Affairs 
Committee regarding the Draft Law.90  The organizations made a slate of 
recommendations and presented a civil society-developed alternative version 
of the Draft Law on Associations.91  On August 19, 2013, before the close of 
Parliament for the September recess, the lower house issued a revised 
version of the Draft Law, with a revised title—the Association Registration 
Law.92  This draft reportedly reflects a number of key comments made by 
CSOs during consultations. 93   On August 29, 2013, the revised Draft 
Association Registration Law was posted on Parliament’s website (in 
Burmese only).94   
Despite the remarkable occurrence of the government meeting with 
and responding directly to concerns raised by civil society organizations 
given the military government’s historically repressive treatment of them, 
the law still included several draconian policies, including harsh punitive 
measures that were not in line with international standards.95  Perhaps even 
more remarkably then, on November 4, 2013, the newspaper published 
another revised version of the Draft Association Registration Law that 
abandoned some of the more draconian measures and reflected further 
substantial improvement over prior versions, including the July 27th and 
August 19th versions of the draft law.96   
Despite the Draft Law reportedly continuing to contain some 
concerning elements,97 the process of collaboration between the government 
                                                      
88   INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, NGO LAW MONITOR: MYANMAR (BURMA) (2014), 
available at http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/Myanmar.html. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 Id. 
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and civil society in revising and drafting the law nicely illustrates the 
changing winds of reform in Myanmar.  The collaborative, participatory 
approach heralded by international NGOs and pushed by local, grassroots 
actors seems precisely the kind of rights-based approach to organic legal 
reform of which adherents of the Cosmopolitan legal ethic would approve.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The occurrences that have taken place in Myanmar in the past five 
years are nothing short of remarkable—both in their rapidity and their far-
reaching implication.  To Burma watchers and those with interest in issues of 
democratization and transitional development, the reforms under Thein 
Sein’s civilian, military-backed government have offered a rare glimpse into 
a government’s attempt to transform the country from one of the most 
repressive in the world to one in line with contemporary standards. 
Nevertheless, in spite of many clear and promising moves away from 
repressive rule, much reform remains to be accomplished.  One way to begin 
to address Myanmar’s systemic failures is for the government to open itself 
to more assistance from the international community and to encourage an 
open and free civil society.  While international organizations should be 
careful not to repeat past development mistakes and should be cognizant of 
the failures of previous such movements, the government of Myanmar 
should also eschew its historically xenophobic policies toward such 
organizations and allow grassroots organizations to take root and thrive.   
The reform effort that occurred during the summer and fall of 2013 
with regard to the association laws is a promising illustration of the reformed 
Myanmarese government.  The willingness of the government to meet and 
collaborate with civil society, and members of Parliament to draft and re-
draft a new association law that addressed many of the past law’s 
deficiencies is nothing less than remarkable given its repressive history.  
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen just how responsive the ultimate law will 
be to criticisms and whether the punitive and restrictive features of the law 
will remain in place.  The government should continue to pursue reforms in 
this and other areas in a similarly participatory manner, eventually 
addressing the many contentious and repressive policies that keep 
Myanmar’s road to reform long and winding.  
 
